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Based on results given in the recent book by Meinhardt (2013c), which presents a dual
characterization of the pre-kernel by a finite union of solution sets of a family of quadratic
and convex objective functions, we could derive some results related to the uniqueness of the
pre-kernel. Rather than extending the knowledge of game classes for which the pre-kernel
consists of a single point, we apply a different approach. We select a game from an arbitrary
game class with an unique pre-kernel satisfying the non-empty interior condition of a pay-
off equivalence class, and then establish that the set of related and linear independent games
which are derived from this pre-kernel of the default game replicate this point also as its sole
pre-kernel element. In the proof we apply results and techniques employed in the above work.
Namely, we prove in a first step that the linear mapping of a pre-kernel element into a specific
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a pre-kernel element can be mapped. Furthermore, we establish that on the restricted subset
on the game space that is constituted by the convex hull of the default and the set of related
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1 INTRODUCTION
The coincidence of the kernel and nucleolus – that is, the kernel consists of a single point – is only known
for some classes of transferable utility games. In particular, it was established by Maschler et al. (1972)
that for the class of convex games – introduced by Shapley (1971) – the kernel and the nucleolus coincide.
Recently, Geta´n et al. (2012) were able to extend this result to the class of zero-monotonic almost-convex
games. However, for the class of average-convex games, there is only some evidence that both solution
concepts coalesce.
In order to advance our understanding about TU games and game classes which possess an unique
pre-kernel element, we propose an alternative approach to investigate this issue while applying results and
techniques recently provided in the book by Meinhardt (2013c). There, it was shown that the pre-kernel
of the grand coalition can be characterized by a finite union of solution sets of a family of quadratic and
convex functions (Theorem 7.3.1). This dual representation of the pre-kernel is based on a Fenchel-
Moreau generalized conjugation of the characteristic function. This generalized conjugation was in-
troduced by Martinez-Legaz (1996), which he called the indirect function. Immediately thereafter, it
was Meseguer-Artola (1997) who proved that the pre-kernel can be derived from an over-determined
system of non-linear equations. This over-determined system of non-linear equations is equivalent to a
minimization problem, whose set of global minima is equal to the pre-kernel set. However, an explicit
structural form of the objective function that would allow a better and more comprehensive understanding
of the pre-kernel set could not be performed.
The characterization of the pre-kernel set by a finite union of solution sets was possible due to a
partition of the domain of the objective function into a finite number of payoff sets. From each payoff
vector contained into a particular payoff set the same quadratic and convex function is induced. The
collection of all these functions on the domain composes the objective function from which a pre-kernel
element can be single out. Moreover, each payoff set creates a linear mapping that maps payoff vectors
into a vector subspace of balanced excesses. Equivalent payoff sets which reflects the same underlying
bargaining situation produce the same vector subspace. The vector of balanced excesses generated by a
pre-kernel point is contained into the vector subspace spanned by the basis vectors derived from the payoff
set that contains this pre-kernel element. In contrast, the vectors of unbalanced excesses induced from the
minima of a quadratic function does not belong to its proper vector subspace. An orthogonal projection
maps these vectors on this vector subspace of the space of unbalanced excesses (c.f. Meinhardt (2013c,
Chap. 5-7)).
From this structure a replication result of a pre-kernel point can be attained. This is due that from
the payoff set that contains the selected pre-kernel element, and which satisfies in addition the non-empty
interior condition, a null space in the game space can be identified that allows a variation within the game
parameter without affecting the pre-kernel properties of this payoff vector. Even though the values of
the maximum surpluses have been varied, the set of most effective coalitions remains unaltered by the
parameter change. Hence, a set of related games can be determined, which are linear independent, and
possess the selected pre-kernel element of the default game as well as a pre-kernel point (c.f. Meinhardt
(2013c, Sect. 7.6)). In the sequel of this paper, we will establish that the set of related games, which
are derived from a default game exhibiting a singleton pre-kernel, must also possess the same unique pre-
kernel, and therefore coincides with the pre-nucleolus. Notice, that these games need not necessarily be
convex, average-convex, totally balanced, or zero-monotonic. They could belong to different subclasses
of games, however, they must satisfy the non-empty interior condition. Moreover, we show that the pre-
kernel correspondence in the game space restricted to the convex hull that is constituted by the extreme
points, which are specified by the default and related games, is single-valued, and therefore continuous.
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The structure of the paper is organized as follows: In the Section 2 we introduce some basic notations
and definitions to investigate the coincidence of the pre-kernel with the pre-nucleolus. Section 3 provides
the concept of the indirect function and gives a dual pre-kernel representation in terms of a solution set.
In the next step, the notion of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions is introduced in order to
identify payoff equivalence classes on the domain of the objective function from which a pre-kernel ele-
ment can be determined. Moreover, relevant concepts from Meinhardt (2013c) are reconsidered. Section 4
studies the uniqueness of the pre-kernel for related games. However, Section 5 investigates the continuity
of the pre-kernel correspondence. In Section 6 some sufficient conditions are worked out under which the
pre-nucleolus of a default game can preserve the pre-nucleolus property for related games. A few final
remarks close the paper.
2 SOME PRELIMINARIES
A n-person cooperative game with side-payments is defined by an ordered pair 〈N, v〉. The set N :=
{1, 2, . . . , n} represents the player set and v is the characteristic function with v : 2N → R, and the
convention that v(∅) := 0. Elements of N are denoted as players. A subset S of the player set N is called
a coalition. The real number v(S) ∈ R is called the value or worth of a coalition S ∈ 2N . However, the
cardinality of the player set N is given by n := |N |, and that for a coalition S by s := |S|. We assume
throughout that v(N) > 0 and n ≥ 2 is valid. Formally, we identify a cooperative game by the vector
v := (v(S))S⊆N ∈ Gn = R2|N| , if no confusion can arise, whereas in case of ambiguity, we identify a
game by 〈N, v〉.
A possible payoff allocation of the value v(S) for all S ⊆ N is described by the projection of a vector
x ∈ Rn on its |S|-coordinates such that x(S) ≤ v(S) for all S ⊆ N , where we identify the |S|-coordinates
of the vector x with the corresponding measure on S, such that x(S) :=
∑
k∈S xk. The set of vectors
x ∈ Rn which satisfies the efficiency principle v(N) = x(N) is called the pre-imputation set and it is
defined by
I 0(v) := {x ∈ Rn |x(N) = v(N)} , (2.1)
where an element x ∈ I 0(v) is called an pre-imputation.
Given a vector x ∈ I 0(v), we define the excess of coalition S with respect to the pre-imputation x in
the game 〈N, v〉 by
ev(S,x) := v(S)− x(S). (2.2)
A non-negative (non-positive) excess of S at x in the game 〈N, v〉 represents a gain (loss) to the members
of the coalition S unless the members of S do not accept the payoff distribution x by forming their own
coalition which guarantees v(S) instead of x(S).
Take a game v ∈ Gn. For any pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, the maximum surplus of player i over
player j with respect to any pre-imputation x ∈ I 0(v) is given by the maximum excess at x over the set
of coalitions containing player i but not player j, thus
sij(x, v) := max
S∈Gij
ev(S,x) where Gij := {S | i ∈ S and j /∈ S}. (2.3)
The expression sij(x, v) describes the maximum amount at the pre-imputation x that player i can gain
without the cooperation of player j. The set of all pre-imputations x ∈ I 0(v) that balances the maximum
surpluses for each distinct pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j is called the pre-kernel of the game v, and is
defined by
PrK(v) :=
{
x ∈ I 0(v) | sij(x, v) = sji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
. (2.4)
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In order to define the pre-nucleolus ν(v) of a game v ∈ Gn, take any x ∈ Rn to define a 2n-tuple vector
θ(x) whose components are the excesses ev(S,x) of the 2n coalitions S ⊆ N , arranged in decreasing
order, that is,
θi(x) := e
v(Si,x) ≥ ev(Sj ,x) =: θj(x) if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 2n. (2.5)
Ordering the so-called complaint or dissatisfaction vectors θ(x) for all x ∈ Rn by the lexicographic order
≤L on Rn, we shall write
θ(x) <L θ(y) if ∃ an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n, (2.6)
such that θi(x) = θi(y) for 1 ≤ i < k and θk(x) < θk(y). Furthermore, we write θ(x) ≤L θ(y) if
either θ(x) <L θ(y) or θ(x) = θ(y). Now the pre-nucleolus PrN(v) over the pre-imputations set I 0(v)
is defined by
PrN(v) =
{
x ∈ I 0(v) | θ(x) ≤L θ(y) ∀ y ∈ I 0(v)
}
. (2.7)
The pre-nucleolus of any game v ∈ Gn is non-empty as well as unique, and it is referred to as ν(v) if the
game context is clear from the contents or ν(N, v) otherwise.
3 A DUAL PRE-KERNEL REPRESENTATION
The concept of a Fenchel-Moreau generalized conjugation – also known as the indirect function of a char-
acteristic function game – was introduced by Martinez-Legaz (1996), and provides the same information as
the n-person cooperative game with transferable utility under consideration. This approach was success-
fully applied in Meinhardt (2013c) to give a dual representation of the pre-kernel solution of TU games
by means of solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions. In this section, we review some
crucial results extensively studied in Meinhardt (2013c, Chap. 5 & 6) as the building blocks to investigate
the single-valuedness of the pre-kernel correspondence.
Theorem 3.1 (Martinez-Legaz (1996)). The indirect function pi : Rn → R of any n-person TU game is a
non-increasing polyhedral convex function such that
(i) ∂pi(x) ∩ {−1, 0}n 6= ∅ ∀x ∈ Rn,
(ii) {−1, 0}n ⊂ ⋃x∈Rn ∂pi(x), and
(iii) minx∈Rn pi(x) = 0.
Conversely, if pi : Rn → R satisfies (i)-(iii) then there exists an unique n-person TU game 〈N, v〉 having
pi as its indirect function, its characteristic function is given by
v(S) = min
x∈Rn
{
pi(x) +
∑
k∈S
xk
}
∀ S ⊂ N. (3.1)
According to the above result, the associated indirect function pi : Rn → R+ is given by:
pi(x) = max
S⊆N
{
v(S)−
∑
k∈S
xk
}
∀x ∈ Rn, (3.2)
whereas ∂pi is the subdifferential of the function pi. Hence, ∂pi(x) is the set of all subgradients of pi at x,
which is a closed convex set. A characterization of the pre-kernel in terms of the indirect function is due
to Meseguer-Artola (1997). Here, we present this representation in its most general form, although we
restrict ourselves to the the trivial coalition structure B = {N}.
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Proposition 3.1 (Meseguer-Artola (1997)). For a TU game with indirect function pi, a pre-imputation
x ∈ I 0(v) is in the pre-kernel of 〈N, v〉 for the coalition structure B = {B1, . . . , Bl}, x ∈ PrK(v,B), if,
and only if, for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, every i, j ∈ Bk, i < j, and some δ ≥ δ1(v,x), one receives
pi(x i,j,δ) = pi(x j,i,δ).
Meseguer-Artola (1997) was the first who recognized that based on the result of Proposition 3.1 a
pre-kernel element can be derived as a solution of an over-determined system of non-linear equations.
Every over-determined system can be equivalently expressed as a minimization problem. The set of global
minima coalesces with the pre-kernel set. For the trivial coalition structure B = {N} the over-determined
system of non-linear equations is given byfij(x) = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, i < jf0(x) = 0 (3.3)
where, for some δ ≥ δ1(x, v),
fij(x) := pi(x
i,j,δ)− pi(x j,i,δ) ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j, (3.3-a)
and
f0(x) :=
∑
k∈N
xk − v(N). (3.3-b)
To observe that the system above is over-determined one has to take into account that the differences fij
in the maximum surpluses are residuals which define the corresponding vector functions of the system of
non-linear equations. For the coalition structure B = {N}, we count in total n · (n− 1)/2 residuals. This
implies that the system must be over-determined, since we have (n · (n − 1)/2 + 1) non-linear vector
functions and only n unknown variables. Finally, notice that to any over-determined system an equivalent
minimization problem is associated such that the set of global minima coincides with the solution set of
the system. The solution set of such a minimization problem is the set of values for x which minimizes
the following function
h(x) :=
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(fij(x))
2 + (f0(x))
2 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Rn. (3.4)
As we will notice in the sequel, this optimization problem is equivalent to a least squares adjustment. For
further details see Meinhardt (2013c, Chap. 6).
Corollary 3.1 (Meinhardt (2013c)). For a TU game 〈N, v〉 with indirect function pi, it holds that
h(x) =
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(fij(x))
2 + (f0(x))
2 = min
y∈I0(v)
h(y) = 0, (3.5)
if, and only if, x ∈ PrK(v).
Proof. To establish the equivalence between the pre-kernel set and the set of global minima, we have to
notice that in view of Theorem 3.1 0 = miny h is in force. Now, we prove necessity while taking a pre-
kernel element, i.e. x ∈ PrK(v), then the efficiency property is satisfied with f0(x) = 0 and the maximum
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surpluses sij(x, v) must be balanced for each distinct pair of players i, j, implying that fij(x) = 0 for all
i, j ∈ N, i < j and therefore h(x) = 0. Thus, we are getting x ∈ M(h). To prove sufficiency, assume
that x ∈M(h), then h(x) = 0 with the implication that the efficiency property f0(x) = 0 and fij(x) = 0
must be valid for all i, j ∈ N, i < j. This means that the difference fij(x) = (pi(xi,j,δ) − pi(xj,i,δ))
is equalized for each distinct pair of indices i, j ∈ N, i < j. Thus, x ∈ PrK(v). It turns out that the
minimum set coincides with the pre-kernel, i.e., we have:
M(h) = {x ∈ I 0(v) | h(x) = 0} = PrK(v), (3.6)
with this argument we are done.
Corollary 3.1 gives an alternative characterization of the pre-kernel set in terms of a solution set. Sin-
gling out a pre-kernel element by solving the above minimization problem is, for instance, possible by
a modified Steepest Descent Method. However, a direct method is not applicable. This is due to fact
that the objective function h is the difference of two convex functions and that due to Theorem 3.1 the
indirect function pi is a non-increasing polyhedral convex function. This implies that function h is not
continuous differentiable everywhere and that its structural form is ambiguous. Nevertheless, Proposi-
tion 6.2.2 (c.f. Meinhardt (2013c)) characterizes the objective function h as the composite of a finite
family of quadratic functions. In the sequel, we do not discuss the whole details which would go beyond
the scope of the paper, here we focus only on the aspect that the domain of function h can be partitioned
into payoff equivalence classes. On each payoff equivalence class a quadratic and convex function can
be identified. Pasting the finite collection of quadratic and convex functions together reproduces function
h. For a thorough and more detailed discussion of this topic, we refer the reader to Section 5.4 and 6.2
in Meinhardt (2013c).
To understand the structural form of the objective function h, we will first identify equivalence relations
on its domain. To start with, we define the set of most effective or significant coalitions for each pair of
players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j at the payoff vector x by
Cij(x) :=
{
S ∈ Gij
 sij(x, v) = ev(S,x)}. (3.7)
This set determines all those coalitions of player i excluding the opponent j on which player i can rely
upon to ensure his claim in a bilateral bargaining situation in order to split the gains through mutual
cooperation. Gathering for all pair of player i, j ∈ N, i 6= j all these coalitions that support the claim of a
specific player over some other players, we have to consider the concept of the collection of most effective
or significant coalitions w.r.t. x, which we define as in Maschler et al. (1979, p. 315) by
C(x) :=
⋃
i,j∈N
i 6=j
Cij(x). (3.8)
Notice that this set generically has not cardinality one, and it might be too large to be suitable to identify
an equivalence relations on the domain of function h. In order to derive an equivalence relation on the
domain, we need to diminish this set while removing any form of ambiguity. By doing so, we rely on the
idea that a player who has the opportunity to rely on two allies of equal strength but of different sizes for
supporting his claim, has strong preference to the coalition with the smallest number of members, i.e. for
those where he has to convince the fewest to support his demand.
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From the set of most effective or significant coalitions of a pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j at the payoff
vector x the smallest cardinality over the set of most effective coalitions is defined as
Φij(x) := min
{
|S|
 S ∈ Cij(x)}. (3.9)
Gathering all these sets having smallest cardinality for all pairs of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, we end up with
Ψij(x) :=
{
S ∈ Cij(x)
Φij(x) = |S|}. (3.10)
For selecting a set from the collection of coalitions of equal size, we refer to the concept of a lexicograph-
ical order. Now, examine two coalitions having the same cardinality, namely coalition S := {i1, . . . , iq}
and T := {j1, . . . , jq} with 2 ≤ q ≤ n − 1, coalition S is lexicographically smaller than coalition T if
there is some integer k with 1 ≤ k ≤ q such that
il = jl for 1 ≤ l < k, and ik < jk.
This relation will be denoted by S <L T .
With respect to an arbitrary payoff vector x, the set of coalitions of smallest cardinality Ψij(x) which
is minimized w.r.t. the lexicographically order <L is determined by
Sij(x) :=
{
S ∈ Ψij(x)
S <L T for all S 6= T ∈ Ψij(x)} ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. (3.11)
We call this set, the lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions w.r.t. x of pair i, j ∈ N, i 6=
j. This set is well defined and possesses cardinality one, i.e. |Sij(x)| = 1, which allows us to single
out an unique coalition for this specific pair of players at x. Then we are able to specify the set of
lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions w.r.t. x through
S(x) :=
{
Sij(x)
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. (3.12)
This set will be indicated in short as the set of lexicographically smallest coalitions or just more suc-
cinctly most effective coalitions whenever no confusion can arise. Notice that this set is never empty
and can uniquely be identified. This implies that the cardinality of this set is equal to n · (n − 1). In the
following we will observe that from these type of sets equivalence relations on the domain domh can be
identified.
To see this, consider the correspondence S on domh and two different vectors, say x and ~γ, then
both vectors are said to be equivalent w.r.t. the binary relation ∼ if, and only if, they induce the same
set of lexicographically smallest coalitions, that is, x ∼ ~γ if, and only if, S(x) = S(~γ). In case that the
binary relation ∼ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, then it is an equivalence relation and it induces
equivalence classes [~γ] on domh which we define through
[~γ] :=
{
x ∈ dom h
x ∼ ~γ}. (3.13)
Thus, if x ∼ ~γ, then [x] = [~γ], and if x  ~γ, then [x] ∩ [~γ] = ∅. This implies that whenever the binary
relation ∼ induces equivalence classes [~γ] on domh, then it partitions the domain domh of the function
h. The resulting collection of equivalence classes [~γ] on domh is called the quotient of domh modulo
∼, and we denote this collection by domh/ ∼. We indicate this set as an equivalence class whenever the
context is clear, otherwise we apply the term payoff set or payoff equivalence class.
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Proposition 3.2. The binary relation ∼ on the set domh defined by x ∼ ~γ ⇐⇒ S(x) = S(~γ) is an
equivalence relation, which forms a partition of the set domh by the collection of equivalence classes
{[~γk]}k∈J , where J is an arbitrary index set. Furthermore, for all k ∈ J , the induced equivalence class
[~γk] is a convex set .
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013c, p. 59).
The cardinality of the collection of the payoff equivalence classes induced by a TU game is finite
(c.f. Meinhardt (2013c, Proposition 5.4.2.)). Furthermore, on each payoff equivalence class [~γ] from
the domh an unique quadratic and convex function can be identified. Therefore, there must be a finite
composite of these functions that constitutes the objective function h. In order to construct such a quadratic
and convex function suppose that ~γ ∈ [~γ]. From this vector we attain the collection of most effective
coalitions S(~γ) in accordance with Proposition 3.2. Then observe that the differences in the values between
a pair {i, j} of players are defined by αij := (v(Sij) − v(Sji)) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N, i < j, and α0 :=
v(N) > 0 w.r.t. S(~γ). All of these q-components compose the q-coordinates of a payoff independent
vector ~α, with q =
(
n
2
)
+ 1. A vector that reflects the degree of unbalancedness of excesses for all pair of
players, is denoted by ~ξ ∈ Rq, that is a q-column vector, which is given by
ξij := e
v(Sij , ~γ)− ev(Sji, ~γ) = v(Sij)− γ(Sij)− v(Sji) + γ(Sji) ∀ i, j ∈ N, i < j,
= v(Sij)− v(Sji) + γ(Sji)− γ(Sij) = αij + γ(Sji)− γ(Sij) ∀ i, j ∈ N, i < j,
ξ0 := v(N)− γ(N) = α0 − γ(N).
(3.14)
In view of Proposition 3.2, all vectors contained in the equivalence class [~γ] induce the same set S(~γ), and
it holds
ξij := e
v(Sij , ~γ)− ev(Sji, ~γ) = sij(~γ, v)− sji(~γ, v) =: ζij ∀ i, j ∈ N, i < j. (3.15)
The payoff dependent configurations ~ξ and ~ζ having the following interrelationship outside its equivalence
class: ~ξ 6= ~ζ for all y ∈ [~γ]c. Moreover, equation (3.15) does not necessarily mean that for ~γ ′, ~γ∗ ∈
[~γ], ~γ ′ 6= ~γ∗, it holds ~ξ ′ = ~ξ∗. Hence, the vector of (un)balanced excesses ~ξ is only equal with the vector
of (un)balanced maximum surpluses ~ζ if the corresponding pre-imputation ~γ is drawn from its proper
equivalence class [~γ].
In addition, we write for sake of simplicity that Eij := (1Sji − 1Sij ) ∈ Rn, ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j, and
E0 := −1N ∈ Rn. Combining these q-column vectors, we can construct a (n×q)-matrix inRn×q referred
to as E, and which is given by
E := [E1,2, . . . ,En−1,n,E0] ∈ Rn×q . (3.16)
Proposition 3.3 (Quadratic Function). Let be 〈N, v〉 a TU game with indirect function pi, then an arbitrary
vector ~γ in the domain of h, i.e. ~γ ∈ domh, induces a quadratic function:
hγ(x) = (1/2) · 〈 x,Qx 〉+ 〈 x,a 〉+ α x ∈ domh, (3.17)
where a is a column vector of coefficients, α is a scalar and Q is a symmetric (n× n)-matrix with integer
coefficients taken from the interval [−n · (n− 1), n · (n− 1)].
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013c, pp. 66-68).
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By the above discussion, the objective function h and the quadratic as well as convex function hγ
of type (3.17) coincide on the payoff set [~γ] (c.f. Meinhardt (2013c, Lemma 6.2.2)). However, on the
complement [~γ]c it holds h 6= hγ .
Proposition 3.4 (Least Squares). A quadratic function hγ given by equation (3.17) is equivalent to
〈 ~α+E> x, ~α+E> x 〉 = ‖ ~α+E> x ‖2. (3.18)
Therefore, the matrix Q ∈ Rn2 can also be expressed as Q = 2 · E E>, and the column vector a as
2 ·E ~α ∈ Rn. Finally, the scalar α is given by ‖~α‖2, where E ∈ Rn×q,E> ∈ Rq×n and ~α ∈ Rq.
Proof. The proof can be found in Meinhardt (2013c, pp. 70-71).
Realize that the transpose of a vector or a matrix is denoted by the symbols x>, and Q> respectively.
Lemma 3.1. Let x, ~γ ∈ domh,x = ~γ + z and let ~γ induces the matrices E ∈ Rn×q,E> ∈ Rq×n
determined by formula (3.16), and ~α, ~ξ ∈ Rq as in equation (3.14). If x ∈M(hγ), then
1. −E> x = P ~α.
2. E> ~γ = P (~ξ − ~α) = (~ξ − ~α).
3. −E> z = P ~ξ.
In addition, let q :=
(
n
2
)
+1. The matrixP ∈ Rq2 is either equal to 2 ·E>Q−1E, if the matrixQ ∈ Rn2 is
non-singular, or it is equal to 2 ·E>Q†E, if the matrix Q is singular. Furthermore, it holds for the matrix
P that P 6= Iq and rankP ≤ n.
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013c, pp. 80-81).
Notice that Q† is the Moore-Penrose or pseudo-inverse matrix of matrix Q, if matrix Q is singular.
This matrix is unique according to the following properties:
• QQ†Q = Q (general condition),
• Q†QQ† = Q† (reflexive condition),
• (QQ†)> = Q†Q (normalized condition),
• (Q†Q)> = QQ† (reversed normalized condition).
Proposition 3.5 (Orthogonal Projection Operator). Matrix P is idempotent and self-adjoint, i.e. P is an
orthogonal projection operator.
Proof. The proof can be found in Meinhardt (2013c, p. 86).
Lemma 3.2. Let E be a subspace of Rq with basis {e1, . . . , em} derived from the linear independent
vectors of matrix E> having rank m, with m ≤ n, and let {w1, . . . ,wq−m} be a basis of W := E⊥. In
addition, define matrix E> := [e1, . . . , em] ∈ Rq×m, and matrix W> := [w1, . . . ,wq−m] ∈ Rq×(q−m),
then for any ~β ∈ Rq it holds
1. ~β = [E> W>] · c where c ∈ Rq is a coefficient vector, and
2. the matrix [E> W>] ∈ Rq×q is invertible.
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013c, pp. 90-91).
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Notice that E can be interpreted as indicating a vector subspace of balanced excesses. A pre-imputation
will be mapped into its proper vector subspace of balanced excesses E, i.e. the vector subspace induced
by the pre-imputation. However, the corresponding vector of (un)balanced excesses generated by this
pre-imputation is an element of this vector subspace of balanced excesses, if the pre-imputation is also a
pre-kernel point. Hence, the vector of balanced excesses coincides with the vector of balanced maximum
surpluses. This is a consequence of Lemma 3.1 or see Proposition 8.4.1 in Meinhardt (2013c). Otherwise,
this vector of unbalanced excesses will be mapped by the orthogonal projection P on E. More information
about the properties of this kind of vector subspace can be found in Meinhardt (2013c, pp. 87-113 and 138-
168).
Proposition 3.6 (Positive General Linear Group). Let {e1, . . . , em} as well as {e11, . . . , e1m} be two or-
dered bases of the subspace E derived from the payoff sets [~γ] and [~γ1], respectively. In addition, define the
associated basis matrices E>, E>1 ∈ Rq×m as in Lemma 3.2, then the unique transition matrix X ∈ Rm
2
such that E>1 = E>X is given, is an element of the positive general linear group, that is X ∈ GL+(m).
Proof. The proof can be found in Meinhardt (2013c, p. 101).
Proposition 3.6 denotes two payoff sets [~γ] and [~γ1] as equivalent, if there exists a transition matrix X
from the positive general linear group, that is X ∈ GL+(m), such that E>1 = E>X is in force. Notice
that the transition matrix X must be unique (c.f. Meinhardt (2013c, p. 102)). The underlying group action
(c.f. Meinhardt (2013c, Corollary 6.6.1)) can be interpreted that a bargaining situation is transformed into
an equivalent bargaining situation. For a thorough discussion of a group action onto the set of all ordered
bases, the interested reader should consult Meinhardt (2013c, Sect. 6.6).
The vector space Rq is an orthogonal decomposition by the subspaces E and NE. We denote in the
sequel a basis of the orthogonal complement of space E by {w1, . . . ,wq−m}. This subspace of Rq is
identified by W := NE = E⊥. In addition, we have Pwk = 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , q −m}. Thus, we can
obtain the following corollary
Corollary 3.2 (Meinhardt (2013c)). If ~γ induces the matrices E ∈ Rn×q,E> ∈ Rq×n determined by
formula (3.16), then with respect to the Euclidean inner product, getting
1. Rq = E⊕W = E⊕ E⊥.
A consequence of the orthogonal projection method presented by the next theorem and corollary is
that every payoff vector belonging to the intersection of the minimum set of function hγ and its payoff
equivalence class [~γ] is a pre-kernel element. This due to hγ = h on [~γ].
Theorem 3.2 (Orthogonal Projection Method). Let ~γk ∈ [~γ] for k = 1, 2, 3. If ~γ2 ∈ M(hγ) and ~γk /∈
M(hγ) for k = 1, 3, then ~ζ2 = ~ξ2 = 0, and consequently ~γ2 ∈ PrK(v).
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013c, pp. 109-111).
Corollary 3.3 (Meinhardt (2013c)). Let be [~γ] an equivalence class of dimension 3 ≤ m ≤ n, and
x ∈M(hγ) ∩ [~γ], then ~α = P ~α, and consequently x ∈ PrK(v).
4 THE UNIQUENESS OF THE PRE-KERNEL
To study the uniqueness of the pre-kernel solution of a related TU game derived from a pre-kernel element
of a default game, we need to know: (1) if the linear mapping of a pre-kernel element into a specific
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vector subspace of balanced excesses E consists of a single point, and (2) that there cannot exist any other
non-transversal vector subspace of balanced excesses E1 in which a linear transformation of pre-kernel
element can be mapped. (3) It must be shown that the pre-kernel coincides with the pre-nucleolus of the
set of related games, otherwise, it is obvious that there must exist at least a second pre-kernel point, namely
the pre-nucleolus.
For conducting this line of investigation some additional concepts are needed. In a first step we intro-
duce the definition of a unanimity game, which is indicated by
uT (S) :=
{
1 T ⊆ S
0 otherwise,
whereas T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅, which forms a unanimity/game basis. A formula to express the coordinates of
this basis is given by
v =
∑
T⊂N,
T 6=∅
λvT uT ⇐⇒ λvT =
∑
S⊂T,
S 6=∅
(−1)t−s · v(S),
if 〈N, v〉, where |S| = s, and |T | = t. A coordinate λvT is said to be an unanimity coordinate of game
〈N, v〉, and vector λv is called the unanimity coordinates of game 〈N, v〉. Notice that we assume here that
the game is defined in R2n−1 rather than R2n , since we want to write for sake of convenience the game
basis in matrix form without a column and row of zeros. Thus we write
v =
∑
T⊂N,
T 6=∅
λvT uT = [u{1}, . . . ,u{N}]λ
v = U λv
where the unanimity basis U is in Rp′×p′ with p′ = 2n − 1. In addition, define the unity games (Dirac
games) 1T for all T ⊆ N by
1T (S) :=
{
1 if T = S,
0 otherwise.
(4.1)
In the next step, we select a payoff vector ~γ, which also determines its payoff set [~γ]. With regard to
Proposition 3.2, this vector induces in addition a set of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions
indicated by S(~γ). Implying that we get the configuration ~α by the q-coordinates αij := (v(Sij) −
v(Sji)) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N, i < j, and α0 := v(N). Furthermore, we can also define a set of vectors as
the differences of unity games (4.1) w.r.t. the set of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions,
which is given by
vij := 1
Sij − 1Sji for Sij , Sji ∈ S(~γ) and v0 := 1N , (4.2)
whereas vij ,v0 ∈ Rp′ for all i, j ∈ N, i < j. With these column vectors, we can identify matrix
V := [v1,2, . . . ,vn−1,n,v0] ∈ Rp′×q. Then we obtain ~α = V> v with v ∈ Rp′ due to the removed empty
set. Moreover, by the measure y(S) :=
∑
k∈S yk for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , we extend every payoff vector y
to a vector y ∈ Rp′ , and define the excess vector at y by ey := v − y ∈ Rp′ , then we get ~ξy = V> ey.
From matrix V>, we can also derive an orthogonal projection PV specified by V> (V>)† ∈ Rq×q such
that Rq = V ⊕ V⊥ is valid, i.e. the rows of matrix V> are a spanning system of the vector subspace
V ⊆ Rq×q, thus V := span{v>1,2, . . . ,v>n−1,n,v>0 }. Vector subspace V reflects the power of the set of
lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions. In contrast, vector subspace E reflects the ascribed
unbalancedness in the coalition power w.r.t. the bilateral bargaining situation attained at ~γ through S(~γ).
The next results show how these vector subspaces are intertwined.
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Lemma 4.1. Let E> ∈ Rq×n be defined as in Equation (3.16), V> ∈ Rq×p′ as by Equation (4.2), then
there exists a matrix Z> ∈ Rp′×n such that E> = V> Z> if, and only if, RE> ⊆ RV> , that is, E ⊆ V.
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013c, p. 141).
Notice that the minimal rank of matrix V> is bounded by E> which is equal to m < n with the
consequence that we get in this case V = E. However, the maximal rank is equal to q, and then V = Rq
(c.f. Meinhardt (2013c, Corollary 7.4.1)).
Lemma 4.2. Let ~α, ~ξ ∈ Rq as in Equation (3.14), then the following relations are satisfied on the vector
space V:
1. PV ~α = ~α ∈ V
2. PV ~ξ = ~ξ ∈ V
3. PV (~ξ − ~α) = (~ξ − ~α) ∈ V
4. PVE> = PE> = E>, hence E ⊆ V
5. PVP = P, hence E ⊆ V
6. EPV = EP = E, hence RE ⊆ V
7. PPV = P, hence E ⊆ V.
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013c, p. 142).
It was worked out by Meinhardt (2013c, Sect. 7.6) that a pre-kernel element of a specific game can
be replicated as a pre-kernel element of a related game whenever the non-empty interior property of the
payoff set, in which the pre-kernel element of default game is located, is satisfied. In this case, a full
dimensional ellipsoid can be inscribed from which some bounds can be specified within the game pa-
rameter can be varied without destroying the pre-kernel properties of the payoff vector of the default
game. These bounds specify a redistribution of the bargaining power among coalitions while supporting
the selected pre-imputation still as a pre-kernel point. Although the values of the maximum excesses have
been changed by the parameter variation, the set of lexicographically smallest most significant coalitions
remains unaffected.
Theorem 4.1 (Replication). If [~γ] has non-empty interior and x ∈ PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ], then x ∈ PrK(vµ) for
all µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ , where vµ = v + µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′ , µ ∈ R
C := min
i,j∈N,i6=j
{ ±√c¯‖E>(1j − 1i)‖
}, (4.3)
and 0 6= ∆ ∈ NW = {∆ ∈ Rp ′ |W∆ = 0} with matrixW := V>U.
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013c, p. 156).
It was also shown there by some examples that the specified bounds by Theorem 4.1 are not tight, in
the sense that pre-kernel points belonging to the relative interior of a payoff set can also be the object of a
replication. However, pre-kernel elements which are located on the relative boundary of a payoff set are
probably not replicable. Therefore, there must exist a more general rule to reproduce a pre-kernel element
for a related game vµ.
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In the course of our discussion, we establish that the single pre-kernel element of a default game which
is an interior point of a payoff set is also the singleton pre-kernel of the derived related games. In a
first step, we show that there exists an unique linear transformation of the pre-kernel point of a related
game into the vector subspace of balanced excesses E. This means, there is no other pre-kernel element
in a payoff equivalence class that belongs to the same set of ordered bases, i.e. reflecting an equivalent
bargaining situation with a division of the proceeds of mutual cooperation in accordance with the pre-
kernel solution. Secondly, we prove that there cannot exist any other vector subspace of balanced excesses
E1 non-transversal to E in which a pre-kernel vector can be mapped by a linear transformation. That is,
there exists no other non-equivalent payoff set in which an other pre-kernel point can be located.
Lemma 4.3 (Meinhardt (2013c)). Let ~γ induces matrix E, then
(E>)† = 2 ·Q†E ∈ Rn×q.
Proof. Remind from Lemma 3.1 that P = 2 ·E>Q†E holds. In addition, note that we have the following
relation Q†Q = (E>)†E> which is an orthogonal projection onto RE. Then attaining
2 ·Q†E = 2 ·Q†QQ†E = 2 · (E>)†E>Q†E
= (E>)†(2 ·E>Q†E) = (E>)†P = (E>)†.
The last equality follows from Lemma 4.2. This argument terminates the proof.
Proposition 4.1 (Meinhardt (2013c)). Let E>1 = E>X with X ∈ SO(n), that is [~γ] ∼ [~γ1], and suppose
~α1 = V
> vµ. In addition, assume that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉
has non-empty interior such that {x} = PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ] is satisfied, then there exists no other pre-kernel
element in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] for a related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, where vµ = v+µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′ , as
defined by Theorem 4.1.
Proof. By the way of contradiction suppose that x,y ∈ PrK(vµ) with y ∈ [~γ1] is valid. Then we get
hv
µ
(x) = hv
µ
γ (x) = ‖E> x+ ~α‖2 = 0 and hv
µ
(y) = hv
µ
γ1 (y) = ‖E>1 y + ~α1‖2 = 0,
implying that
P ~α = ~α ∈ E and P ~α1 = ~α1 ∈ E.
Hence, we have
P ~α− ~α = P ~α1 − ~α1 = 0 ∈ E⇐⇒ P (~α− ~α1) = (~α− ~α1) ∈ E.
Therefore, obtaining the equivalent expression
E> (X y − x) = (~α− ~α1) = V> v −V> (v + µ · v∆) = 0,
then x = X y, since matrix E> has full rank due to {x} = PrK(v). Furthermore, notice that
〈x,y 〉 = 〈 (E>)† ~α, (E>1 )† ~α1 〉 = 〈 (E>)† ~α,X−1 (E>)† ~α 〉 = 〈 2Q†E ~α, 2X−1Q†E ~α 〉 6= 0
Matrix E> has full rank, and Q is symmetric and positive definite, hence Q† = Q−1, and the above
expression can equivalently be written as
〈Q† a, X−1Q† a 〉 = 〈Q−1 a, X−1Q−1 a 〉 = 〈a,QX−1Q−1 a 〉
= 〈a, X1a 〉 = 〈a,a1 〉 6= 0,
(4.4)
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while using a = 2E ~α from Proposition 3.4, and with similar matrix X1 = QX−1Q−1 as well as
a1 = X1 a. According to E>1 = E>X with X ∈ SO(n), we can write X = Q−1(2EE>1 ). But then
X1 = QX
−1Q−1 = Q (2EE>1 )
−1.
Since we have X ∈ SO(n), it holds X−1 = X> implying that
X>1 = X
−1 = (2EE>1 )
−1Q = (2EE>1 )Q
−1 = X> = X−11 ,
which induces X = Q−1 (2EE>1 ) = Q (2EE>1 )−1 = X1. Now, observe
X1 = QX
−1Q−1 = QX>Q−1 = Q (2EE>1 )Q
−1Q−1
= Q (2EE>X)Q−2 = Q2XQ−2,
hence, we can conclude that X = I implying X1 = I as well. We infer that x = y contradicting the
assumption x 6= y due to x ∈ [~γ], and y ∈ [~γ1]. With this argument we are done.
Proposition 4.2. Impose the same conditions as under Proposition 4.1 with the exception that X ∈
GL+(n), then there exists no other pre-kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] for a related TU
game 〈N, vµ 〉.
Proof. By the proof of Proposition 4.1 the system of linear equations E> (X y − x) = 0 is consistent,
then we get x = X y by the full rank of matrix E>. By Equation 4.4 we obtain similar matrix X1 =
QX−1Q−1, hence the matrix X1 is in the same orbit (conjugacy class) as matrix X−1, this implies that
E> = E>1 X−1 = E>1 X1 must be in force. But then E> = E>XX1, which requires that XX1 = I
must be satisfied in accordance with the uniqueness of the transition matrix X ∈ GL+(m) (c.f. Meinhardt
(2013c, p. 102)). In addition, we have a1 = X1 a as well as a1 = 2E1 ~α = X a. Therefore, we obtain
X a1 = a = X
2 a. From this we draw the conclusion in connection with the uniqueness of the transition
matrix X that X = I is valid. Hence, x = y as required.
Proposition 4.3. Assume [~γ]  [~γ1], and that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game
〈N, v 〉 has non-empty interior such that {x} = PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ] is satisfied, then there exists no other pre-
kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] for a related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, where vµ = v + µ · v∆ ∈
Rp′ , as defined by Theorem 4.1.
Proof. We have to establish that there is no other element y ∈ PrK(vµ) such that y ∈ [~γ1] is valid,
whereas y /∈ PrK(v) in accordance with the uniqueness of the pre-kernel for game v. In view of Theo-
rem 4.1 the pre-kernel {x} = PrK(v) of game 〈N, v 〉 is also a pre-kernel element of the related game
〈N, vµ 〉, i.e. x ∈ PrK(vµ) with x ∈ [~γ] due to Corollary 3.2.
Extend the payoff element y to a vector y by the measure y(S) :=
∑
k∈S yk for all S ∈ 2n\{∅}, then
define the excess vector by eµ := vµ−y. Moreover, compute the vector of (un)balanced excesses ~ξ vµ at y
for game vµ by V>1 eµ. This vector is also the vector of (un)balanced maximum surpluses, since y ∈ [~γ1],
and therefore h v
µ
= h v
µ
γ1 on [~γ1] in view of Lemma 6.2.2 by Meinhardt (2013c). Notice that in order to
have a pre-kernel element at y for the related game vµ it must hold ~ξ v
µ
= 0. In addition, by hypothesis
[~γ]  [~γ1], it must hold E> = V> Z> and E>1 = V
>
1 Z
> in view of Lemma 4.1, thus E>1 6= E>X for
all X ∈ GL+(n). This implies that we derive the corresponding matricesW := V>U andW1 := V>1 U,
respectively.
We have to consider two cases, namely ∆ ∈ NW ∩NW1 and ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 .
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1. Suppose ∆ ∈ NW ∩NW1 , then we get
~ξ v
µ
= V>1 e
µ = V>1 (v
µ − y) = V>1 (v − y + µ · v∆) = V>1 (v − y) = V>1 e = ~ξ v 6= 0.
Observe that ~ξ v = V>1 (v − y) 6= 0, since vector y ∈ [~γ1] is not a pre-kernel element of game v.
2. Now suppose ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 , then
~ξ v
µ
= V>1 e
µ = V>1 (v
µ− y) = V>1 (v− y+ µ · v∆) = V>1 e+ µ ·V>1 v∆ = ~ξ v + µ ·V>1 v∆ 6= 0.
Since, we have V>1 (v − y) 6= 0 as well as V>1 v∆ 6= 0, and V>1 v∆ cannot be expressed by
−V>1 (v−y) in accordance with our hypothesis. To see this, suppose that the vector ∆ is expressible
in this way, then it must hold
∆ = − 1
µ
(W1)
† ~ξ v.
However, this implies
W∆ = − 1
µ
W (W1)
† ~ξ v = − 1
µ
(V>U) (V>1 U)
† ~ξ v = − 1
µ
V> (V>1 )
† ~ξ v 6= 0.
This argument terminates the proof.
To complete our uniqueness investigation, we need to establish that the single pre-kernel element of
the default game preserves also the pre-nucleolus property for the related games, otherwise we can be sure
that there must exist at least a second pre-kernel point for the related game different form the first one. For
doing so, we introduce the following set:
Definition 4.1. For every x ∈ Rn, and ψ ∈ R define the set
Dv(ψ,x) := {S ⊆ N | ev(S,x) ≥ ψ} , (4.5)
and let B = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a collection of non-empty sets of N . We denote the collection B as
balanced whenever there exist positive numbers wS for all S ∈ B such that we have
∑
S∈B wS1S = 1N .
The numbers wS are called weights for the balanced collection B and 1S is the indicator function or
characteristic vector 1S : N 7→ {0, 1} given by 1S(k) := 1 if k ∈ S, otherwise 1S(k) := 0.
A characterization of the pre-nucleolus in terms of balanced collections is due to Kohlberg (1971).
Theorem 4.2. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game and let be x ∈ I 0(v). Then x = ν(N, v) if, and only if, for every
ψ ∈ R,Dv(ψ,x) 6= ∅ implies that Dv(ψ,x) is a balanced collection over N.
Proof. For a proof see Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007, pp. 108-109).
Theorem 4.3. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a singleton pre-kernel such that {x} = PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ],
and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v derived from x, then x = ν(N, v µ), whereas the payoff equivalence
class [~γ] has non-empty interior.
Proof. By our hypothesis, x is an interior point of an inscribed ellipsoid with maximum volume ε :=
{y′ |hvγ(y′) ≤ c¯} ⊂ [~γ], whereas hvγ is of type (3.17) and c¯ > 0 (cf. Lemma 7.6.2 by Meinhardt (2013c)).
This implies by Theorem 4.1 that this point is also a pre-kernel point of game vµ, there is no change in set
of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions S(x) under vµ. Moreover, matrix E> induced from
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S(x) has full rank, therefore, the column vectors of matrix E> are a spanning system of Rn. Hence, we
get span {1S |S ∈ S(x)} = Rn, which implies that the corresponding matrix [1S ]S∈S(x) must have rank
n, therefore collection S(x) is balanced (see Lemma 6.1.2 Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007)). The vector x is
also the pre-nucleolus of the game v, therefore we can choose the largest ψ ∈ R s.t. ∅ 6= Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x)
is valid, which is a balanced set. Moreover, we have µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ . Since C > 0, the set Dv(ψ −
2C,x) 6= ∅ is balanced as well. Now observe that ev(S,x)− C ≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) ≤ ev(S,x) + C
for all S ⊆ N . This impliesDv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x) ⊆ Dvµ(ψ−C,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ−2C,x), hence,Dvµ(ψ−C,x)
is balanced. Let c ∈ [−C,C], and from the observation limc↑0 Dvµ(ψ + c,x) = Dvµ(ψ,x) ⊇ Dv(ψ,x),
we draw the conclusion x = ν(N, v µ).
Theorem 4.4. Assume that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉 has non-empty
interior. In addition, assume that game 〈N, v 〉 has a singleton pre-kernel such that {x} = PrK(v) ⊂ [~γ]
is satisfied, then the pre-kernel PrK(vµ) of a related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, as defined by Theorem 4.1,
consists of a single point, which is given by {x} = PrK(vµ).
Proof. This result follows from Theorems 4.1, 4.3, and Propositions 4.2, 4.3.
Example 4.1. In order to illuminate the foregoing discussion of replicating a pre-kernel element consider
a four person average-convex but non-convex game that is specified by
v(N) = 16, v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = 8,
v({1, 3}) = 4, v({1, 4}) = 1, v({1, 2}) = 16/3,
v(S) = 0 otherwise,
with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. For this game the pre-kernel coalesces with the pre-nucleolus, which is given by
the point: ν(v) = PrK(v) = {44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9}. Moreover, this imputation is even an interior point,
thus the non-empty interior condition is valid, hence by Theorem 4.1 a redistribution of the bargaining
power among coalitions can be attained while supporting the imputation {44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9} still as a
pre-kernel element for a set of related games. In order to get a null space NW with maximum dimension
we set the parameter µ to 0.9. In this case, the rank of matrixW must be equal to 4, and we could derive
at most 11-linear independent games which replicate the element {44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9} as a pre-kernel
element. Theorem 4.4 even states that this point is also the sole pre-kernel point, hence the pre-kernel
coincide with the pre-nucleolus for these games (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: List of Gamesd which possess the same unique Pre-Kernela as v
µ = 0.9
Game {1} {2} {1, 2} {3} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3} {4}
v 0 0 16/3 0 4 0 8 0
v1 18/49 32/95 127/24 -1/24 256/59 4/13 175/22 -1/24
v2 -9/25 21/38 89/16 11/48 231/58 42/71 385/47 11/48
v3 -14/45 -1/40 201/41 -28/65 39/11 -19/44 142/19 -28/65
v4 0 0 16/3 0 159/47 16/33 107/14 0
v5 0 0 16/3 0 149/40 -37/102 497/66 0
v6 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
v7 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
v8 0 0 16/3 0 149/40 -37/102 497/66 0
v9 0 0 16/3 0 149/40 -37/102 497/66 0
v10 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
v11 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
µ = 0.9
Game {1, 4} {2, 4} {1, 2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} N ACV b ZM c
v 1 0 8 0 8 0 16 Y Y
v1 79/59 4/13 175/22 -4/57 792/95 10/33 16 N Y
v2 57/58 42/71 385/47 4/7 325/38 31/56 16 N N
v3 6/11 -19/44 142/19 -27/47 319/40 -29/55 16 N Y
v4 41/34 -3/46 428/53 7/34 8 14/25 16 N N
v5 203/120 2/41 167/19 -5/24 8 -9/19 16 N N
v6 1 23/29 139/16 0 8 18/31 16 N N
v7 1 -5/47 139/16 0 8 -8/25 16 N N
v8 19/24 2/41 71/9 83/120 8 26/61 16 N N
v9 19/24 2/41 71/9 -5/24 8 -9/19 16 N N
v10 1 -5/47 475/61 0 8 18/31 16 N N
v11 1 -5/47 475/61 0 8 -8/25 16 N N
a Pre-Kernel and Pre-Nucleolus: {44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9}
b ACV: Average-Convex Game
c ZM: Zero-Monotonic Game
d Note: Computation performed with MatTuGames.
Notice that non of these 11-linear independent related games is average-convex. Only two games,
namely v1 and v3 are zero-monotonic and super-additive. Nevertheless, all games have a non-empty core
and are semi-convex. The cores of the games have between 16 and 24-vertices, and have volumes that
range from approximately 80 to 127 percent of the default core. TU game v2 has the smallest and v3 the
largest core.1 #
5 ON THE CONTINUITY OF THE PRE-KERNEL
In the previous section, we have established uniqueness on the set of related games. Here, we generalize
these results while showing that even on the convex hull comprising the default and related games in the
game space, the pre-kernel must be unique and is identical with the point specified by the default game.
Furthermore, the pre-kernel correspondence restricted on this convex subset in the game space must be
single-valued, and therefore continuous.
Define G(N) := {v ∈ Gn | v(∅) = 0} and
Gnµ,v :=
{
vµ ∈ G(N) |µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′
}
,
this set is the translate of a convex set by v, which is also convex and non-empty with dimension p′ −m′,
if matrixW has rank m′ ≤ q < p′. Then we can construct a convex set in the game space G(N) by taking
the convex hull of game v and the convex set Gnµ,v, thus
Gnc := conv {v,Gnµ,v}.
Theorem 5.1. The pre-kernel PrK(vµ∗) of game vµ∗ belonging to Gnc is unique, and is equal to {x}.
Proof. Let be {x} = PrK(v) for game v. Take a convex combination of games in Gnc , hence
vµ
∗
=
m∑
k=1
tk ·vµk +tm+1 ·v =
m∑
k=1
tk ·(v+µ ·v∆k )+tm+1 ·v = v+µ
m∑
k=1
tk ·v∆k +µ tm+1 ·0 = v+µ ·v∆
∗
,
1The example can be reproduced while using our MATLAB toolbox MatTuGames 2013b. The results can also be verified with
our Mathematica package TuGames 2013a.
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with v∆
∗
:=
∑m
k=1 tk · v∆k + tm+1 · 0, where 0 ≤ tk ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m + 1}, and
∑m+1
k=1 tk = 1.
Then µ v∆
∗ ∈ [−C,C]p′ , thus the set of lexicographically smallest coalitions S(x) does not change. By
Theorem 4.1 the vector {x} = PrK(v) is also a pre-kernel element of game vµ∗ . But then by Theorem 4.4
the pre-kernel of game vµ
∗
consists of a single point, therefore {x} = PrK(vµ∗).
Example 5.1. To see that even on the convex hull G4c , which is constituted by the default and related
games of Table 4.1, a particular TU game has the same singleton pre-kernel, we choose the following
vector of scalars ~t = {1, 3, 8, 1, 2, 4, 3, 5, 7, 9, 2, 3}/48 such that ∑12k=1 tk = 1 is given to construct by
the convex combination of games presented by Table 4.1 a TU game vµ
∗
that reproduces the imputation
{44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9} as its unique pre-kernel. The TU game vµ∗ on this convex hull in the game space
that replicates this pre-kernel is listed through Table 5.1:
Table 5.1: A TU Game vµ
∗
on the Convex Hull G4c with the same singleton Pre-Kernel as v
a,b
Game {1} {2} {1, 2} {3} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3} {4}
vµ
∗
-1/23 8/71 134/25 2/75 530/137 -8/157 1436/187 2/75
Game {1, 4} {2, 4} {1, 2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} N
vµ
∗
179/178 173/1125 1946/239 19/144 576/71 15/232 16
a Pre-Kernel and Pre-Nucleolus: {44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9}
b Note: Computation performed with MatTuGames.
This game is neither average-convex nor zero-monotonic, however, it is again semi-convex and has a rather
large core with a core volume of 97 percent w.r.t. the core of the average-convex game, and 20 vertices in
contrast to 16 vertices respectively. #
Let X and Y be two metric spaces. A set-valued function or correspondence σ of X into Y is a rule that
assigns to every element x ∈ X a non-empty subset σ(x) ⊂ Y. Given a correspondence σ : X  Y, the
corresponding graph of σ is defined by
Gr(σ) := {(x, y) ∈ X× Y | y ∈ σ(x)} . (5.1)
Definition 5.1. A set-valued function σ : X Y is closed, if Gr(σ) is a closed subset of X× Y
The graph of the pre-kernel PrK(v) is given by
Gr(PrK) :=
{
(v,x) | v ∈ Gnc ,x ∈ I0(v), sij(x, v) = sji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
.
Similar, the graph of the solution set of function h of type (3.4) is specified by
Gr(M(h)) :=
{
(v,x) | v ∈ Gnc ,x ∈ I0(v), hv(x) = 0
}
=
⋃
k∈J′
{
(v,x) | v ∈ Gnc ,x ∈ [~γk], hvγk(x) = 0
}
=
⋃
k∈J′
Gr(M(hγk , [~γk])),
with J′ := {k ∈ J | g(~γk) = 0}. This graph is equal to the finite union of graphs of the restricted solution
sets of quadratic and convex functions hγk of type (3.17). The restriction of each solution set of function
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hγk to [~γk] is bounded, closed, and convex (cf. Meinhardt (2013c, Lemmata 7.1.3, 7.3.1)), hence each
graph Gr(M(hγk , [~γk])) from the finite index set J
′ is bounded, closed and convex.
Proposition 5.1. The following relations are satisfied between the above graphs:
Gr(PrK) = Gr(M(hv)) =
⋃
k∈J′
Gr(M(hγk , [~γk])). (5.2)
Hence, the pre-kernel correspondence PrK : G(N) RN is closed and bounded.
Proof. The equality of the graph of the pre-kernel and the solution set of function h follows in view of
Corollary 3.1. Finally, the last equality is a consequence of Theorem 7.3.1 by Meinhardt (2013c). From
this argument boundedness and closedness follows.
Definition 5.2. The correspondence σ : X Y is said to be upper hemi-continuous (uhc) at x if for every
open set O containing σ(x) ⊆ O it exists an open set Q ⊆ Y of x such that σ(x′) ⊆ O for every x′ ∈ Q.
The correspondence σ is uhc, if it is uhc for each x ∈ X.
Definition 5.3. The correspondence σ : X Y is said to be lower hemi-continuous (lhc) at x if for every
open set O in Y with σ(x) ∩ O 6= ∅ it exists an open set Q ⊆ Y of x such that σ(x′) ∩ O 6= ∅ for every
x′ ∈ Q. The correspondence σ is lhc, if it is lhc for each x ∈ X.
Lemma 5.1 (Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007)). Let X be a non-empty and convex polyhedral subset of Rp˜, and
Y ⊆ Rn˜. If σ : X Y is a bounded correspondence with a convex graph, then σ is lower hemi-continuous.
Proof. For a proof see Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007, pp. 185-186).
Theorem 5.2. The pre-kernel correspondence PrK : G(N)  RN is on Gnc upper hemi-continuous as
well as lower hemi-continuous, that is, continuous.
Proof. The non-empty set Gnc is a bounded polyhedral set, which is convex by construction. We draw from
Proposition 5.1 the conclusion that the graph of the pre-kernel correspondence is bounded and closed.
Form Theorem 5.1 it follows | J′ | = 1 on Gnc , this implies that the graph of the pre-kernel correspondence
is also convex on Gnc . The sufficient conditions of Lemma 5.1 are satisfied, hence PrK is lower hemi-
continuous on Gnc . It is known from Theorem 9.1.7. by Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007) that PrK is upper
hemi-continuous on G(N). Hence, on the restricted set Gnc , the set-valued function PrK is upper and
lower hemi-continuous, and therefore continuous. Actual, it is a continuous function on Gnc in accordance
with | J′ | = 1.
Corollary 5.1. The pre-kernel correspondence PrK : G(N) RN is on Gnc single-valued and constant.
Example 5.2. To observe that on the restricted set G4c the pre-kernel correspondence PrK : G(N) RN
is single-valued and continuous, we exemplarily select a line segment in G4c to establish that all games on
this segment have the same singleton pre-kernel. For this purpose, we resume Example 4.1 and 5.1. Then
we choose a vector of scalars ~t := {1, 3, 8, 1, 2, 4 + , 3, 5, 7, 9, 2− , 3}/48 with tk ≥ 0 for each k such
that
∑11
k=0 t

k = 1 and  ∈ [−2, 2]. Thus, we define the line segment in G4c through TU game vµ
∗
from
Example 5.1 by
G4,lc :=
{ 11∑
k=0
tk · vµk
vµk ∈ G4c ,  ∈ [−2, 2]}.
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Therefore, for each game in the line segment G4,lc , we can write
v :=
11∑
k=1
tk · vµk + t0 · v =
11∑
k=1
tk · vµk + t0 · v +

48
(vµ6 − vµ11) = vµ
∗
+

48
(vµ6 − vµ11)
= v + µ · v∆∗ +  µ
48
(v∆6 − v∆11).
We extend the pre-kernel element x = {44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9} to a vector x in order to define the excess
vector under game v as e := v − x, and for game v as e v := v − x, respectively. According to these
definitions, we get for ~ζv

= ~ξv

at x the following chain of equalities:
~ξv

= V> e v

= V>
(
v − x+ µ · v∆∗ +  µ
48
(v∆6 − v∆11)
)
= V> (v − x) = V> e = ~ξ = ~ζ = 0,
The last equality is satisfied, since x is the pre-kernel of game v. Recall that it holds µ v∆
∗
, µ v∆6 , µ v
∆
11 ∈
[−C,C]15, whereas V> v∆∗ = V> v∆6 = V> v∆11 = 0 is in force. Therefore, for each TU game v ∈ G4,lc
we attain
PrK(v) = {44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9}.
The pre-kernel correspondence PrK is a single-valued and constant mapping on G4,lc . Hence its is contin-
uous on the restriction G4,lc , and due to Theorem 5.2 a fortiori on G4c . #
6 PRESERVING THE PRE-NUCLEOLUS PROPERTY
In this section we study some conditions under which a pre-nucleolus of a default can preserve the pre-
nucleolus property in order to generalize the above results in the sense to identify related games with
an unique pre-kernel point even when the default game has not a single pre-kernel point. This question
can only be addressed with limitation, since we are not able to make it explicit while giving only sufficient
conditions under which the pre-kernel point must be at least disconnected, otherwise it must be a singleton.
However, a great deal of our investigation is devoted to work out explicit conditions under which the pre-
nucleolus of a default game will loose this property under a related game.
For the next result remember that a balanced collection B is called minimal balanced, if it does not
contain a proper balanced sub-collection.
Theorem 6.1. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a non unique pre-kernel such that x ∈ PrK(v), y = ν(v)
with x,y ∈ [~γ]v, and x 6= y is satisfied. In addition, let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v with µ 6= 0 derived
from x such that x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ]vµ , and y 6∈ [~γ]vµ holds. If the collection Sv(x) as well as its sub-
collections are not balanced,
1. then y 6∈ PrN(vµ).
2. Moreover, if in addition x = y 6∈ [~γ]vµ , then x 6∈ PrN(vµ).
Proof. The proof starts with the first assertion.
1. By our hypothesis, x is a pre-kernel element of game v and a related game vµ that is derived from
x. There is no change in set of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions Sv(x) under
vµ due to x ∈ [~γ]vµ , hence Sv(x) = Svµ(x). Moreover, we have µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′ . Furthermore, it
holds y = ν(v) by our assumption. Choose a balanced collection B that contains Sv(x) such that
B is minimal. Then single out any ψ ∈ R such that the balanced set Dv(ψ,y) satisfies Sv(x) ⊆
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B ⊆ Dv(ψ,y) 6= ∅. Now choose  > 0 such that Dv(ψ,y) = Dv(ψ − 2 ,y) is given. The set
Dv(ψ − 2 ,y) is balanced as well. Observe that due to x ∈ [~γ]vµ we get µ · v∆(S) ≤  for all
S ⊂ N . However, it exists some coalitions S ∈ Sv(x) such that ev(S,y)− 6≤ ev(S,y)+µ ·v∆(S)
holds. Let c ∈ [−, ], now as limc↑0 Dvµ(ψ+ c,y) = Dvµ(ψ,y) we haveDvµ(ψ,y) ⊆ Dv(ψ,y).
Furthermore, we draw the conclusion that Sv(x) 6⊆ Dvµ(ψ,y) is given due to Sv(x) = Sv(y) 6=
Sv
µ
(y). Therefore, we obtainDv
µ
(ψ,y) ⊂ B ⊆ Dv(ψ−2 ,y), but then the setDvµ(ψ,y) can not
be balanced. Hence, y 6∈ PrN(vµ).
2. Finally, if x = y, then x is the pre-nucleolus of game v, but it does not belong anymore to payoff
equivalence class [~γ] under vµ, that is, [~γ] has shrunk. Therefore, Sv(x) 6= Svµ(x). Define from the
set Sv(x) a minimal balanced collection B that contains Sv(x). In the next step, we can single out
any ψ ∈ R such that the balanced setDv(ψ,x) satisfies Sv(x) ⊆ B ⊆ Dv(ψ,x) 6= ∅. In accordance
with x ∈ PrK(vµ), it must exist an  > 0 within the maximum values can be varied without effecting
the pre-kernel property of x even when x 6∈ [~γ]vµ , thus we have µ · v∆(S) ≤  for all S ⊂ N . This
implies that Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2 ,x) is in force. The set Dv(ψ − 2 ,x) is balanced as well.
However, it exists some coalitions S ∈ Sv(x) such that ev(S,x) −  6≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) is
valid. Let c ∈ [−, ], now as limc↑0 Dvµ(ψ + c,x) = Dvµ(ψ,x) we have Dvµ(ψ,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ,x).
Furthermore, we draw the conclusion that Sv(x) 6⊆ Dvµ(ψ,x) is given due to Sv(x) 6= Svµ(x).
Therefore, we obtain Dv
µ
(ψ,x) ⊂ B ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2 ,x), but then the set Dvµ(ψ,x) can not be
balanced. Hence, x 6∈ PrN(vµ).
Theorem 6.2. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a non unique pre-kernel such that x ∈ PrK(v) ∩ [~γ],
{y} = PrN(v) ∩ [~γ1] is satisfied, and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v with µ 6= 0 derived from x such
that x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ] holds. If ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 , then y 6∈ PrK(vµ) and a fortiori y 6∈ PrN(vµ).
Proof. From the payoff equivalence classes [~γ] and [~γ1] we derive the corresponding matricesW := V>U
and W1 := V>1 U, respectively. By assumption, it is ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 satisfied. From this argument, we
can express the vector of unbalanced excesses ~ξ v
µ
at y by
~ξ v
µ
= V>1 e
µ = V>1 (v
µ − y) = V>1 (v − y + µ · v∆) = ~ξ v + µ ·V>1 v∆ = µ ·V>1 v∆ 6= 0.
Observe that ~ξ v = V>1 (v − y) = 0, since vector y ∈ [~γ1] is a pre-kernel element of game v. However,
due to ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 , we obtain V>1 v∆ 6= 0, it follows that y 6∈ PrK(vµ). The conclusion follows that
y 6∈ PrN(vµ) must hold.
Theorem 6.3. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a non unique pre-kernel such that x ∈ PrK(v)\PrN(v)
and x ∈ [~γ]. If 〈N, vµ 〉 is a related game of v with µ 6= 0 derived from x such that x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ]
holds, then x 6∈ PrN(vµ).
Proof. According to our assumption x is not the pre-nucleolus of game v, this implies that there exists
some ψ ∈ R such thatDv(ψ,x) 6= ∅ is not balanced. Recall that the set of lexicographically smallest most
effective coalitions Sv(x) has not changed under vµ, since x is a pre-kernel element of game vµ which still
belongs to the payoff equivalence class [~γ]. Then exists a bound  > 0 within the maximum surpluses can
be varied without effecting the pre-kernel property of x. Thus, we get Dv(ψ,x) = Dv(ψ − 2 ,x) 6= ∅ is
satisfied. Then ev(S,x)−  ≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) ≤ ev(S,x) +  for all S ⊆ N , therefore, this implies
Dv
µ
(ψ − ,x) = Dv(ψ,x). The set Dvµ(ψ − ,x) is not balanced, we conclude that x 6∈ PrN(vµ).
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Theorem 6.4. Assume that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉 has non-empty
interior. In addition, assume that the pre-kernel of game 〈N, v 〉 constitutes a line segment such that
x ∈ PrN(v) ∩ ∂[~γ], PrK(v) ∩ [~γ1], and x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ] is satisfied, then the pre-kernel PrK(vµ) of a
related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉 with µ 6= 0 derived from x is at least disconnected, otherwise unique.
Proof. In the fist step, we have simply to establish that for game vµ the pre-imputations lying on the part of
line segment included in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] under game v will loose their pre-kernel properties
due to the change in the game parameter. In the second step, we have to show that the pre-nucleolus x
under game v is also the pre-nucleolus of the related game vµ.
1. First notice that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] has full dimension in accordance with its non-empty
interior condition. This implies that the vector xmust be the sole pre-kernel element in [~γ] (c.f. with
the proof of Theorem 7.8.1 in Meinhardt (2013c)). By our hypothesis, it is even a boundary point
of the payoff equivalence class under game v. Moreover, it must hold [~γ]  [~γ1], since the rank
of the induced matrix E> is n, and that of E>1 is n − 1, therefore, we have E>1 6= E>X for all
X ∈ GL+(n).
In the next step, we select an arbitrary pre-kernel element from PrK(v)∩ [~γ1], say y. By hypothesis,
there exists a related game vµ of v such that x ∈ PrK(vµ) ∩ [~γ] holds, that is, there is no change
in matrix E and vector ~α implying hv
µ
(x) = hv
µ
γ (x) = 0. This implies that for game v
µ the
payoff equivalence class [~γ] has been enlarged in such a way that we can inscribe an ellipsoid with
maximum volume ε := {y′ |hvµγ (y′) ≤ c¯}, whereas hv
µ
γ is of type (3.17) and c¯ > 0 (cf. Lemma
7.6.2 by Meinhardt (2013c)). It should be obvious that element x is an interior point of ε, since
x = M(hv
µ
γ ) ⊂ ε ⊂ [~γ]. We single out a boundary point x′ in ∂[~γ] under game vµ which was a
pre-kernel element under game v, and satisfying after the parameter change the following properties:
x′ ∈ ∂[~γ] ∩ [~γ1] with x′ = x + z, and z 6= 0. This is possible due to the fact that the equivalence
class [~γ] has been enlarged at the expense of equivalence class [~γ1], which has shrunk or shifted by
the change in the game parameter. Observe now that two cases may happen, that is, either x′ ∈ ε or
x′ /∈ ε. In the former case, we have hvµγ (x′) = hv
µ
(x′) = hvµγ1 (x
′) = c¯ > 0, and in the latter case,
we have hv
µ
γ (x
′) = hvµ(x′) = hvµγ1 (x
′) > c¯ > 0 = hv(x′) = hvγ1(x
′).
From hv
µ
γ1 (x
′) > 0 and notice that the vector of unbalanced excesses at x′ is denoted as ~ξ vµ , we
derive the following relationship
hv
µ
γ1 (x
′) = ‖ ~ξ vµ ‖2 = ‖ ~ξ v + µ ·V>1 v∆ ‖2 = ‖µ ·V>1 v∆ ‖2 = µ2 · ‖V>1 v∆ ‖2 > 0,
with µ 6= 0. Thus, we have V>1 v∆ 6= 0, and therefore ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 . Observe that ~ξ v =
V>1 (v− x′) = 0, since vector x′ ∈ [~γ1] is a pre-kernel element of game v. Take the vector y ∈ [~γ1]
from above that was on the line segment as vector x′ under game v which constituted a part of the
pre-kernel of game v, we conclude that y 6∈ PrK(vµ) in accordance with V>1 v∆ 6= 0.
2. By our hypothesis, x is the pre-nucleolus of game v, and an interior point of equivalence class
[~γ] of the related game vµ. Using a similar argument as under (1) we can inscribe an ellipsoid with
maximum volume ε, whereas hv
µ
γ is of type (3.17) and c¯ > 0. In accordance with the assumption that
x is also pre-kernel element of game vµ, we can draw the conclusion that the set of lexicographically
smallest most effective coalitions S(x) has not changed under vµ. But then, we have µ · v∆ ∈
[−C,C]p′ . Moreover, matrix E> induced from S(x) has full rank, therefore, the column vectors
of matrix E> are a spanning system of Rn. Hence, we get span {1S |S ∈ S(x)} = Rn as well,
which implies that matrix [1S ]S∈S(x) has rank n, the collection S(x) must be balanced (c.f. Lemma
6.1.2 Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007)). In accordance with vector x as the pre-nucleolus of game v,
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we can choose the largest ψ ∈ R s.t. ∅ 6= Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x) is valid, which is a balanced set.
Since C > 0, the set Dv(ψ − 2C,x) 6= ∅ is balanced as well. Now observe that ev(S,x) − C ≤
ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) ≤ ev(S,x) + C for all S ⊆ N . This implies Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x) ⊆ Dvµ(ψ −
C,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2C,x), hence, Dvµ(ψ − C,x) is balanced. To conclude, let c ∈ [−C,C], and
from the observation limc↑0 Dv
µ
(ψ + c,x) = Dv
µ
(ψ,x) ⊇ Dv(ψ,x), we draw the implication
x = ν(N, v µ).
Finally, recall that the vector x is also the unique minimizer of function hv
µ
γ , which is an interior point
of payoff equivalence class [~γ], therefore the pre-kernel of the related game vµ cannot be connected.
Otherwise the pre-kernel of the game consists of a single point.
Corollary 6.1. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a non single-valued pre-kernel such that x ∈ PrN(v)∩
∂[~γ] and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v derived from x, whereas x ∈ int [~γ]vµ , then x = ν(N, v µ).
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have established that the set of related games derived from a default game with an unique
pre-kernel must also possess this pre-kernel element as its single pre-kernel point. Moreover, we have
shown that the pre-kernel correspondence in the game space restricted to the convex hull comprising the
default and related games is single-valued and constant, and therefore continuous. Although, we could
provide some sufficient conditions under which the pre-nucleolus of a default game – whereas the pre-
kernel constitutes a line segment – induces at least a disconnected pre-kernel for the set of related games, it
is, however, still an open question if it is possible to obtain from a game with a non-unique pre-kernel some
related games that have an unique pre-kernel. In this respect, the knowledge of more general conditions
that preserve the pre-nucleolus property is of particular interest.
Even though, we have not provided a new set of game classes with a sole pre-kernel element, we
nevertheless think that the presented approach is also very useful to bring forward our knowledge about
the classes of transferable utility games where the pre-kernel coalesces with the pre-nucleolus. To answer
this question, one need just to select boundary points of the convex cone of the class of convex games
to enlarge the convex cone within the game space to identify game classes that allow for a singleton pre-
kernel.
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